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HSC BRIEFING

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analyzed
EAST GERMANY *long study*

- I. Last week Ulbricht purged three leading members of the regime (party number two man Karl Schirdewan, party theoretician Fred Oelsner, and former security chief Ernst Wollweber; none under arrest).
- A. Purge climaxed long dispute between Ulbricht, who favors hard Stalinist line, and group of top-ranking party members who wanted regime to follow more moderate policies.

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II.

A. Opposition motivated by:

1. Realization that Ulbricht's oppressive policies would only lead to increased unrest and offered no solution to East Germany's economic ills and
2. Ulbricht's arrogant and high-handed behavior.

B. Ulbricht will probably extend purge as he moves to enforce his policies.

C. He is now free to bring economy more directly under state control and speed up production.

III. Effect will be to create atmosphere conducive to strikes, disorders.

A. Disturbances equalling 1953's uprising not expected.

B. Efforts will probably be made to halt refugee flow, including restrictions on entry to Berlin, probably not to extent of seriously jeopardizing Western position in Berlin.

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- IV. Ulbricht's mandate to impose Stalinist policies reflects Kremlin's fear that relaxation in this Westernmost Satellite would lead to disaster.**
- A. Soviets fear revolt in East Germany more than in any other Satellite.**
 - B. Strong factor motivating USSR's German policy is continuing state of unrest in Eastern Europe.**
 - C. Finally, Ulbricht's continuation of hard-line policies further illustrates rigidity of Kremlin's position on German issue.**
 - 1. Soviet policy is obviously to maintain status quo by whatever means necessary.**

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